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During the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States experienced
widespread shortages of patented drugs and goods. But although states
negotiated with foreign governments to obtain needed medical equipment,
they were seemingly powerless to obtain or produce their own supply of
scarce drugs. This Essay proposes an unorthodox solution to drug shortages
during public health emergencies: states could disregard the Patent Act and
directly produce or import needed patented drugs. The doctrine of state
sovereign immunity shields states from having to pay damages when they
violate federal law, including patent law. Moreover, courts and agencies are
generally unwilling to award injunctions or other prospective relief if it
disserves the public interest. State action is admittedly not a perfect solution
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to patent-related drug shortages and comes with a variety of costs and risks,
including retaliation from the U.S. Food & Drug Administration. But at
minimum, it could serve as a means for pressuring the federal government
and pharmaceutical companies to work to provide drugs to the public.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States experienced
shortages of needed drugs and medical equipment. 1 Some state governments
were able to broker deals with foreign governments and import needed
personal protective equipment and medical devices. 2 But when it came to
1

See Joseph Walker, All Remdesivir Supplies to Be Distributed in U.S. by Maker Gilead
Sciences, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2020, 4:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/all-remdesivirsupplies-to-be-distributed-in-u-s-by-maker-gilead-sciences-11601575201 (noting that
remdesivir was in short supply from when it became authorized for emergency use, with the
shortage dissipating only in late September 2020); Daniel Joseph Finkenstadt et al., Why the
U.S. Still has a Severe Shortage of Medical Supplies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/09/why-the-u-s-still-has-a-severe-shortage-of-medical-supplies
(discussing the 2020 personal protective equipment shortage).
2
See Beth Healy & Christine Willmsen, ‘I Have A Guy In China’: Inside The Pandemic
Market For Medical Masks, WBUR (June 11, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/investigations/
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obtaining scarce patented drugs, states had few options. This led to U.S.
hospitals being forced to ration remdesivir,3 despite abundant supply in some
low-income countries.4
Ideally, in situations like this, the United States would take action. The
federal government may produce patented goods without permission,5 and it
can use this power as a bargaining chip.6 The President also has powers under
the Defense Production Act (DPA) that can be used to facilitate drug
production.7 For example, in March 2021, the Biden Administration used the
DPA to help secure an agreement for Merck to produce Johnson & Johnson’s
COVID-19 vaccine.8 However, these tools are only useful if the federal
2020/06/11/massachusetts-mask-brokering-chaos-characters (detailing how Massachusetts
obtained N95 masks from China); Pamela Wood & Luke Broadwater, Maryland Secures
500,000 Coronavirus Tests from South Korea; Hogan’s Initiative Sparks Criticism from
Trump, BALT. SUN (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-mdhogan-testing-20200420-atxs3grvbjdgphzzt4tfhuhnbm-story.html
(discussing
how
Maryland secured 500,000 coronavirus tests from South Korea); Tina Sfondeles, Illinois
Gets Second PPE Shipment from China with ‘Lots of Surgical Masks,’ CHI. SUN-TIMES (Apr.
20, 2020, 1:44 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/coronavirus/2020/4/20/21228325/
illinois-ppe-shipment-china-surgical-masks-coronavirus-covid-19 (discussing Illinois’s two
purchases of personal protective equipment from China).
3
See Eric Boodman & Casey Ross, Doctors Lambaste Federal Process for Distributing
Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir, STAT NEWS (May 6, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/
05/06/doctors-lambaste-federal-process-for-distributing-covid-19-drug-remdesivir/
(discussing the remdesivir shortage in various states including Massachusetts and California
in May 2020); Elizabeth Cohen, Covid-19 Drug Rationed in the US is Plentiful in Developing
Countries, CNN (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/09/health/covid-remdesivirus-vs-other-countries/index.html (discussing how doctors in Texas were forced to choose
which patients would receive remdesivir in July 2020); Eric Boodman, From Houston to
Miami, Hospitals Running Short of Remdesivir for Covid-19 Patients, STAT NEWS (July 10,
2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/10/hospitals-running-short-of-remdesivir-forcovid19-patients/ (discussing remdesivir shortages in Texas, Florida, and Arizona in July
2020).
4
See Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing of Patents During Pandemics, 54 CONN. L.
REV. (forthcoming Mar. 5, 2021) (discussing the 2020 remdesivir shortage).
5
If the government provides funding for research resulting in an invention, it retains a
royalty-free license under the Bayh-Dole Act and may issue a compulsory license to a third
party to produce the invention. See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4). If the government or its
contractor infringes a non-government funded invention, the patent holder’s compensation
is limited to “reasonable and entire compensation.” See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
6
See infra, Part III.C.
7
See 50 U.S.C. § 4501 et. seq. (2018).
8
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., Biden Administration Announces
Historic Manufacturing Collaboration Between Merck and Johnson & Johnson to Expand
Production of COVID-19 Vaccines (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/
2021/03/02/biden-administration-announces-historic-manufacturing-collaborationbetween-merck-johnson-johnson-expand-production-covid-19-vaccines.html (noting that
Biden invoked the Defense Production Act (DPA) to support vaccine production). An
anonymous government official noted that the DPA provided an “implicit” incentive to
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government is willing to use them, something that was not the case in 2020. 9
Under background principles of the U.S. Constitution and the Eleventh
Amendment, states enjoy sovereign immunity and cannot be sued by private
parties for damages when they violate federal law, absent their express
consent.10 Although state sovereign immunity can be waived by Congress
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 a prior attempt to do so for patent
infringement was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 12 As a
result, patent holders are currently unable to sue state infringers for
damages.13
This protection presents an opportunity for states to alleviate shortages of
patented drugs during public health emergencies. States could attempt to
import patented drugs or produce drugs themselves, and then use their
sovereign status to shield against damages. Although individual state officers
could still be sued for prospective relief, 14 public welfare considerations
would make it difficult for the patent holder to receive a permanent injunction
or an exclusion order.15
cooperate, given “the potential to use the DPA if there isn’t cooperation.” Tamara Keith,
How the White House Got 2 Pharma Rivals to Work Together on COVID-19 Vaccine, NPR
(Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/973117712/how-the-white-house-got-2pharma-foes-to-work-together-on-covid-19-vaccine.
9
The Republican-controlled government was hostile to compulsory licensing for drugs,
with HHS Secretary Alex Azar referring to the practice as “socialist.” James Love, Hits and
Misses from the Senate HELP Committee Hearing on the President’s Blueprint for Lower
Drug Prices, HARV. L. PETRIE-FLOM CTR.: BILL OF HEALTH (June 14, 2018),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/14/hits-and-misses-from-the-senate-helpcommittee-hearing-on-the-presidents-blueprint-for-lower-drug-prices/. President Trump
was criticized for his lack of willingness to use his powers under the DPA to alleviate
shortages of needed medical supplies. See Andrew Jacobs, Despite Claims, Trump Rarely
Uses Wartime Law in Battle Against Covid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/health/Covid-Trump-Defense-Production-Act.html.
10
See infra, Part II.A.
11
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (discussing Congress’s
authority to abrogate sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment).
12
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 634 (1999) (striking down Congress’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity for patent
law under the Patent Remedy Act); see also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020)
(holding that Congress’s waiver of state sovereign immunity under the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act was unconstitutional).
13
See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 634.
14
See infra, Part II.A.1; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (establishing a
legal fiction allowing a state officer to be sued for prospective relief).
15
See infra, Part III.A.1; see also, eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(holding a party seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test, including
demonstrating “that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction”);
Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Americas, 955 F.3d 1328, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that a
party seeking injunctive relief “must prove that it meets all four equitable factors”).
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State-driven solutions admittedly have serious drawbacks. Even if a drug
is approved by a foreign regulatory agency, it can be seized by the U.S. Food
& Drug Administration (FDA) for lacking U.S. approval. 16 Although the
FDA granted emergency waivers to states importing unapproved medical
equipment, including masks and ventilators,17 it is unclear that the FDA
would be willing to do the same with drugs. Forcing states to act individually
is also inefficient. For example, in 2020, states ended up in bidding wars
against each other for needed medical equipment, which likely drove up
prices.18 Pharmaceutical companies could furthermore retaliate by declining
to open new facilities or create jobs in states that disregard patent rights.
Nevertheless, a state action could serve as a catalyst for getting the federal
government and the patent holder to work out a solution.19
This Essay considers whether states could utilize state sovereign
immunity to alleviate drug shortages. Part II discusses the doctrine’s scope
and discusses how it has been applied by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit in patent infringement cases. Part III then discusses how states might
use sovereign immunity to shield against damages while providing patented
drugs to their citizens. It considers various obstacles that a state might face if
it contracts with a domestic or foreign third-party supplier, and it discusses
the possibility of states producing their own drugs. It then argues that even if
states are not ultimately successful, merely attempting to obtain patented
drugs could have a valuable shaming effect, pressuring the federal
government and the relevant pharmaceutical company to reach a solution.
Part IV consequently concludes that state patent infringement could serve a
16

See Phil Galewitz, Amid Pandemic, FDA Seizes Cheaper Drugs from Canada, MIAMI
HERALD (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/health-care/article
242085586.html (discussing how the FDA has increased seizures of prescription drugs being
sent to U.S. customers from Canadian and other foreign pharmacies).
17
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Emergency Use Authorizations for Medical Devices (updated June 30, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/emergency-use-authorizations-medicaldevices/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-emergency-use-authorizations-medical-devices
(providing emergency authorization for personal respiratory protective devices and other
medical devices related to the COVID-19 pandemic).
18
See Lauren Feiner, States are Bidding Against Each Other and the Federal
Government for Important Medical Supplies—and it’s Driving Up Prices, CNBC (Apr. 11,
2020,
8:44
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/09/why-states-and-the-federalgovernment-are-bidding-on-ppe.html (documenting that in 2020, states ended up in bidding
wars against other states and the federal government for medical supplies, including
ventilators and personal protective equipment).
19
The federal government possesses the ability to use patents without the patent holder’s
permission under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the Bayh Dole Act. It can also issue compulsory
licenses to third parties to produce needed drugs, shielding the third party from suit. See
generally Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing of Patents During Pandemics, 54 CONN. L.
REV. (forthcoming Mar. 5, 2021).
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useful role during pandemics and other public health emergencies.

II. AN INTRODUCTION TO STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Dual state and federal sovereignty is “a defining feature” of the U.S.
Constitution.20 After joining the Union, states retained certain attributes of
their former independence, including immunity from private suits.21
Although state sovereign immunity is not absolute, it limits plaintiffs’
recovery from states that violate federal law. Section A examines the scope
of state sovereign immunity and looks at which state-related entities are
shielded. Section B then discusses how courts have applied the doctrine in
patent infringement cases.
A. The Scope of State Sovereign Immunity
Although the Eleventh Amendment directly addresses state sovereign
immunity, much of the doctrine is based on background principles of the
Constitution that have been articulated by federal courts. Courts of appeal
remain divided, however, with regard to whether immunity extends to state
government contractors.
1. The Scope of State Sovereign Immunity under the Constitution
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 22 However,
the doctrine of state sovereign immunity arises from a broader constitutional
background principle: that each state is a sovereign entity that may not be
sued absent its consent.23 As the Supreme Court noted in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida: “For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated by the Constitution
20

Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (quoting
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)); see Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (finding state waiver of immunity “where stated ‘by the most
express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room
for any other reasonable construction.’” (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S.
151, 171 (1909))).
21
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 751.
22
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
23
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“It is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.” (quoting
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890))).
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when establishing the judicial power of the United States.’” 24
The doctrine serves the purpose of “accord[ing] States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities.” 25
State immunity is not absolute. By ratifying the U.S. Constitution, states
consented to be sued by other states and by the federal government. 26 The
Eleventh Amendment’s reach is “necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” meaning that Congress may
abrogate immunity legislatively without state consent. 27 However, the
Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot do so absent a pattern of
constitutional violations and “a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”28
These requirements sharply limit Congress’s power to abrogate. 29
Under Ex parte Young, a plaintiff may still sue a state employee in the
employee’s official capacity to obtain prospective relief. 30 Ex parte Young
creates a legal fiction that when a state officer violates federal law, he or she
is “stripped” of official status for the purpose of establishing federal subject
matter jurisdiction.31 In such a circumstance, “[t]he state has no power to
impart” to the officer “any immunity from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States,”32 notwithstanding the fact that the injunction
or declaratory judgment sought would effectively be against the state. This
legal fiction serves the purpose of allowing federal courts “to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible.” 33 To utilize Ex parte
Young, the plaintiff must sue a state officer with “some connection with the
enforcement of the act.”34 As the Federal Circuit has observed, injunctive
24

Id. (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15).
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 760.
26
Id. at 752.
27
Atascadaro State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (quoting Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
28
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639 (1999) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997)).
29
Infra, Part II.B.
30
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60. The plaintiff may not use an Ex parte Young
suit to get damages of any sort, though ancillary relief is available. See Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (noting that “a federal court’s remedial power. . .is necessarily
limited to prospective injunctive relief” and consequently “may not include a retroactive
award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury”).
31
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160 (“The state has no power to impart to [an officer
under suit] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States”);
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1210-11 (2001)
(discussing Ex parte Young’s legal fiction).
32
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160.
33
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)
(quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160).
34
Id. at 157.
25
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relief is limited to the named state officer who is violating federal law and
does not bind the state as a whole. 35
2. What is the “State”?
To determine “whether a state instrumentality may invoke the State’s
immunity” courts consider “the relationship between the State and the entity
in question.”36 Courts may also “examine[] the essential nature and effect of
the proceeding” or “the nature of the entity created by state law to determine
whether it should be treated as an arm of the State.”37 Applying this
framework, the Supreme Court has held that state agencies including public
universities are entitled to sovereign immunity.38 However, local
governments and municipalities are not covered, 39 despite sharing some state
powers.40
There is uncertainty regarding whether state sovereign immunity extends
to private state government contractors. In Shands Teaching Hospital and
Clinics, Inc. v. Beech Street Corp., the Eleventh Circuit applied a balancing
test and extended sovereign immunity to third-party health insurance
administrators.41 The court maintained that the “pertinent inquiry” is with
regard to the corporation’s “function or role in a particular context,” and
observed that the administrators were “acting at the behest of the State” and
were controlled by it.42 It further observed that Florida would have been liable
for any damages award against the administrators. 43
35

Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir.

2006).
36

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
Id.
38
See id. (holding the University of California is shielded from suit by the Eleventh
Amendment); Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 536 (2002) (noting that
the University of Minnesota is “an arm of the State of Minnesota” for sovereign immunity
purposes); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 669 (1974) (finding the Eleventh Amendment
barred retroactive payment of benefits from the Illinois Department of Public Aid); see also
Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of Intellectual
Property by State and Municipalities, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 877 (1998) (discussing
what is a state for sovereign immunity purposes).
39
See Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Serv. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (partially
overruling Monroe v. Pape, and holding that the City of New York could be subjected to suit
under § 1983 without its consent).
40
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
41
208 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2000). The court noted sovereign immunity “may
extend to defendants other than the State based upon: (1) how state law defines the entity;
(2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; and (3) from where the entity
derives its funds and who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” Id. at 1311.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1312-13.
37
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Other courts of appeal have declined to extend state sovereign immunity
to private companies, while leaving open the possibility of doing so in future
cases. For example, in United States ex rel. Barron v. Deloitte & Touche,
LLP, the Fifth Circuit held that a private Medicaid provider was ineligible for
sovereign immunity.44 The court applied a six-factor test 45 to determine
whether “the state is the real, substantial party in interest” that would
ultimately pay any judgment.46 In distinguishing Shands, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized the fact that the state would bear no financial liability for any
judgment rendered against the contractor.47
The Ninth Circuit has taken the least permissive approach, categorically
declining to expand sovereign immunity to any private entity. 48 Although it
employs a multifactor test,49 a private contractor will always fail at least four
of the five requirements.50 The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
has been cautious about expanding the doctrine and maintained that
extending sovereign immunity to private contractors would impermissibly
limit Congress’s Article I power to create privately-enforceable federal
causes of action.51
B. Sovereign Immunity in Patent Law
1. Overview
Sovereign immunity shields both the federal and state governments from

44

United States ex rel. Barron v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 381 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir.

2004).
45

The six factors are: (1) “Whether the state statutes and case law view the agency as an
arm of the state;” (2) “The source of the entity’s funding;” (3) “The entity’s degree of local
autonomy;” (4) “Whether the entity is concerned primarily with local as opposed to
statewide, problems;” (5) “Whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in its own
name;” and (6) “Whether the entity has the right to hold and use property.” Id. (quoting
Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1999)).
46
Id. at 440 (quoting Hudson, 174 F.3d at 681).
47
Id. Both the Second and Third Circuit emphasize whether the state treasury is liable
as the definitive factor in whether state sovereign immunity applies. Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 51 (1994).
48
Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2008).
49
The Ninth Circuit considers: “(1) whether a money judgment would be satisfied out
of state funds; (2) whether the entity performs central governmental functions; (3) whether
the entity may sue or be sued; (4) whether the entity has the power to take property in its
own name or only in the name of the state; and (5) the corporate status of the entity.” Id. at
1077 (quoting United States ex rel. Ali v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 355 F.3d
1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004)).
50
Id. at 1078.
51
Id. at 1076.
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patent damages suits.52 The federal government has partially consented to be
sued for patent infringement,53 allowing a patent holder to recover
“reasonable and entire compensation for the use and manufacture” of the
patented invention in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.54 Patent holders must
sue within six years of the infringement, 55 cannot seek injunctive or
declaratory relief,56 and cannot demand a jury trial. 57
However, the same is not true with regard to states. If a state sues a private
party for patent infringement, then it waives sovereign immunity with regard
to the cause of action, as well as relevant defenses and counterclaims. 58 But
no state appears to have legislatively consented to be sued for patent
infringement. Consequently, if a state uses a patent without permission, the
patent holder cannot recover any damages and is limited to prospective relief
against relevant state officials under Ex parte Young. This can sometimes
result in public universities engaging in bad behavior, such as acting like
“patent trolls.”59
52

Prior to 1910, patent holders were completely barred from suing the U.S. government
for patent infringement. Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Robert F. Allnutt, Patent Infringement in
Government Procurement: A Remedy Without a Right, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 755, 757
(1966).
53
28 U.S.C. § 1498 also waives federal sovereign immunity for copyright infringement.
54
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1998). See generally Kumar, supra note 4.
55
All claims that are brought in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims are subject to a sixyear statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The statute of limitations may be tolled if the
patentee files an administrative claim. Bondyopadhyay v. United States, 2020 U.S. Claims
LEXIS 1003, at *36-37 (Fed. Cl. 2020) (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 286).
56
See Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 511 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“It is clear that [35
U.S.C. § 1498] “was enacted for the purpose of enabling the Government to purchase goods
for the performance of its functions without the threat of having the supplier enjoined from
selling patented goods to the Government”); TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057,
1059-60 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (observing that legislative history supports the purpose of § 1498
is “to relieve private Government contractors from expensive litigation with patentees,
possible injunctions, payment of royalties, and punitive damages” and holding that § 1498
immunity extends to a competitor for a government contract).
57
Suits against the U.S. government must be brought in the Article I Court of Federal
Claims, which does not offer jury trials. 28 U.S.C. § 1498; see also Mark Lemley, Why Do
Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 98 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1717 (2013) (noting that “trials in
the Court of Claims are to judges, not juries” even though under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 “damages
are the only remedy available”).
58
Univ. of Fla. Res. Found. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
59
See Walter D. Valdivia, Patent Infringement Suits Have a Reputational Cost for
Universities, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
techtank/2015/11/10/patent-infringement-suits-have-a-reputational-cost-for-universities-2/
(discussing the Wisconsin Alumni Resource Foundation’s and other public universities’
patent troll-like behavior in extracting revenue from companies); see also James Boyle &
Jennifer Jenkins, Mark of the Devil: The University as a Brand Bully, 31 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. (forthcoming 2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3780381 (discussing how the Ohio State University, Boise State
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2. Patent-Related Case Law on Sovereign Immunity
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s waiver of state
sovereign immunity under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act was unconstitutional.60 The statute expressly held that
states, state instrumentalities, and state officers and employees were not
immune under the Eleventh Amendment and doctrine of sovereign immunity
for patent infringement.61 However, the Court observed that “Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern
of constitutional violations.”62 It further noted that state patent infringement
“does not by itself violate the Constitution,” unless “the State provides no
remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its
infringement of their patent.”63 Finding “scant support” for states “depriving
patent owners of property without due process of law,” the Court concluded
that the provisions “are ‘so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.’” 64
If a state chooses to sue a defendant for patent infringement, then the
defendant may challenge the validity of its patents. For example, in
University of Florida Research Foundation v. General Electric Co., the
University of Florida Research Foundation (UFRF) sued General Electric
(GE) for patent infringement. GE moved to dismiss, arguing that the patent
was directed towards ineligible subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act,
while UFRF claimed that its sovereign status blocked GE’s attempt to
invalidate its patent.65 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court, holding
that the patent was invalid. It noted that UFRF waived its immunity by
“voluntarily appearing in federal court,”66 and that that this waiver extended
“to any relevant defenses and counterclaims.” 67
University, and the University of Texas have all acted as “trademark bullies”).
60
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
647-48 (1999).
61
Id. at 632 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 296(a)).
62
Id. at 640.
63
Id. at 643.
64
Id. at 646 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532
(1997)). The Court has ruled similarly with regard to copyrights, affirming a lower court’s
decision to strike down the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act as unconstitutional. Allen
v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020) (holding that “Florida Prepaid all but prewrote” the
decision to strike down the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act as unconstitutional).
65
Univ. of Fla. Res. Found. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
66
Id. at 1365 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1124
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
67
Id. (quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed.
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States are furthermore not immune from inter partes review (IPR)
challenges in the Patent Trial and Appeals Board. In Regents of Univ. of
Minn. v. LSI Corp., the University of Minnesota claimed sovereign immunity
shielded it from an IPR challenge of several of its patents. 68 The Federal
Circuit acknowledged that sovereign immunity applies “to agency
adjudications brought by private parties that are similar to court
adjudications.”69 However, it noted that the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed
Techs., LLC v. Lee “concluded that IPR proceedings are essentially agency
reconsideration of a prior patent grant.” 70 The Federal Circuit consequently
held that state sovereign immunity does not apply, given “that IPR is in key
respects a proceeding between the government and the patent owner.” 71
The three judges who issued the decision also provided “additional
views,” noting that sovereign immunity should not apply to in rem
proceedings, even for adversarial proceedings. 72 The Supreme Court has
stated “at least in some contexts,” in rem proceedings do not “interfere with
state sovereignty” even if state interests are impacted.73 The judges noted that
IPRs—which do not involve a state’s territory—appear to be the “type of in
rem proceedings to which state sovereign immunity does not apply.” 74
Overall, the relatively broad scope of state sovereign immunity raises the
possibility that states could utilize it to protect themselves from damages if
they infringe patents to safeguard public health. Part III explores mechanisms
by which states might attempt this, such as by importing or directly producing
drugs.

III. PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH THROUGH STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
As discussed above, states sometimes use sovereign immunity to engage
in bad behavior and avoid paying damages for patent infringement. But could
states use the doctrine to protect public health instead? This Part discusses
two possibilities: states purchasing generic versions of patented drugs from
third parties or alternatively producing patented drugs themselves.

Cir. 2007)).
68
Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
69
Id. at 1337.
70
Id. at 1338 (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)).
71
Id. at 1339.
72
Id. at 1342 (additional views of Dyk, Wallach, and Hughes, Circuit Judges).
73
Id. at 1343 (quoting Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 370 (2006)).
74
Id. at 1346.
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A. States Obtaining Patented Drugs from Third Parties
There are two ways that a state could obtain drugs from third parties. First,
a state could contract with a domestic company to produce patented drugs on
its behalf. However, as noted earlier, most courts of appeal have declined to
extend state sovereign immunity to state contractors.75 Consequently, the
patent holder could potentially sue a domestic third-party manufacturer for
patent infringement, even if the manufacturer was producing drugs on behalf
of a state.
Alternatively, a state could import patented drugs from a country that
either does not offer drug patents76 or has issued a compulsory license
authorizing third-party manufacturing. 77 Although a court could hold a
foreign manufacturer liable as an infringer, the patent holder could have
trouble collecting damages if the manufacturer lacks U.S.-based assets. 78
Moreover, if the state were to pay a reasonable royalty to the patent holder, it
is unclear that the state’s action would rise to the level of a due process
violation under Florida Prepaid.79

75

See supra, Part II.A.2.
World Trade Organization member countries that are classified as Least-Developed
Nations are exempt until 2033 from having to offer patents on drug compounds under the
TRIPS Agreement. LDC Portal, WTO Drugs Patent Waiver for LDCs Extended Until 2033,
UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/ldcportal/wto-drugs-patent-waiver-for-ldcs-extended
-until-2033 (last visited March 30, 2021). Consequently, countries such as Bangladesh may
produce drugs such as remdesivir that are patented in most other countries. See Zeba
Siddiqui, Bangladesh’s Beximco to Begin Producing COVID-19 Drug Remedesivir,
REUTERS (May 5, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirusbangladesh-remdesi/exclusive-bangladeshs-beximco-to-begin-producing-covid-19-drugremdesivir-coo-idUSKBN22H1DD.
77
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154 (providing WTO members with the right to issue compulsory licenses in certain
circumstances).
78
Countries generally will not enforce foreign judgment awards that undermine public
policy. If a U.S. court awarded damages against a foreign generic drug company, it may be
difficult for the patent holder to collect that judgment. See Marketta Trimble, When
Foreigners Infringe Patents: An Empirical Look at the Involvement of Foreign Defendants
in Patent Litigation in the U.S., 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L. J. 499, 508–09
(2011) (discussing the public policy exception to the enforcement of international IP
judgments).
79
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 643 (1999) (noting that a due process violation arises “only where the State provides no
remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their
patent”). Indeed, a state could choose to pay nothing to the patent holder, though this could
lead to future abrogation of sovereign immunity by Congress if it helps establish a pattern of
infringement.
76
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1. Prospective Relief Against States in Federal Court
Although a patent holder cannot sue a state for damages in federal court,
it could sue an appropriate state official and seek an injunction prohibiting
the importation and distribution of the patented drug. 80 However, there is no
guarantee that a patent holder would be able to obtain an injunction against
the state infringer if the infringement benefitted public health. Under eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., “a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction
must satisfy a four-factor test,” demonstrating:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.81

The Federal Circuit has held that a party seeking injunctive relief “must
prove that it meets all four equitable factors,” 82 and has noted in dicta that a
court may not issue an injunction “[i]f a plaintiff fails to show ‘that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.’” 83
Based on existing precedent, it is unclear how the Federal Circuit would
apply eBay to a situation involving a drug shortage. Many scholars regard the
Federal Circuit as being pro-patent84 and the court has claimed in unpublished
80

See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (noting that suits against individual
state officers “to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional” are
permissible if the officer has “some connection with the enforcement of the act”); Pennington
Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Thus,
continuing prospective violations of a federal patent right by state officials may be enjoined
by federal courts under the Ex parte Young doctrine[.]”).
81
eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
82
Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Americas, 855 F.3d 1328, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis
added).
83
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting eBay, 547 U.S.
at 391). Furthermore, if the state had an articulated policy regarding access to medicine, an
argument can be made that the court could consider it under eBay, so long as it does not
conflict with congressional intent. See Dan L. Burk, Patents and State Constitutionally
Protected Speech, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 18 (2020) (noting that “there is
nothing that would prevent a federal court from taking into account state articulations of
public policy” and relying on them so long as they do not conflict with Congressional intent).
84
See Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An
Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit's Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 201
(2017) (“In sum, the Federal Circuit's apparent inclination toward injunctive relief—and thus
more valuable patent rights—lends supports to the claim that the Federal Circuit has used its
position as the primary appellate court over patent claims to shape the law in a pro-patentee
direction.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1114 (2003) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s
major decisions in recent years may have been influenced by bias toward patent holders”).
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dicta that the public has a “strong interest” in protecting patent rights. 85 This
pro-patent view was illustrated in Amgen v. Sanofi, in which the Federal
Circuit issued an injunction against a company that was manufacturing an
infringing cholesterol-lowering drug.86 Although the patent holder sold a
version of the drug to the public, some physicians allegedly preferred the
75mg dose that only the infringer offered. 87 However, the Amgen decision
was based on the fact that drug options were still available, just not in the
preferred dose. In the event of a true drug shortage, such as what occurred in
2020 with remdesivir, the state would have a much stronger argument that an
injunction would harm the public welfare and would therefore be
impermissible under eBay.
2. Agency Actions Against a State Infringer
A state that attempts to import infringing drugs would also be vulnerable
to U.S. agency actions. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and
the FDA both have jurisdiction over imported drugs and may seize
unauthorized shipments. Of these two agencies, the FDA poses the greatest
risk to states.
a. U.S. International Trade Commission
A patent holder could file an action in the ITC under § 1337 of the Tariff
Act. The ITC has the power to issue “exclusion orders,” which block
infringing goods from entering into the United States and are enforced by the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection.88 Although ITC proceedings are
adversarial, the agency’s jurisdiction for exclusion orders is in rem,89
meaning that state sovereign immunity would not necessarily apply. 90 The
ITC can also issue cease-and-desist orders against parties that it has in
personam jurisdiction over.91
85
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 64 Fed. App’x 751, 756 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(unpublished).
86
Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1381–82.
87
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, No. 14-1317-SLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1351, at *8-9 (D.
Del. Jan. 5, 2017)), rev’d in part, 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
88
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d). For an overview of the ITC, see Sapna Kumar, Expert Court,
Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1553-58 (2011).
89
See Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1917-18, 1929
(2015) (discussing the ITC’s in rem jurisdiction for issuing exclusion orders and its
enforceability).
90
See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1343-45 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(additional views) (noting in dicta that states cannot use sovereign immunity to shield
themselves from non-adversarial in rem proceedings).
91
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f).
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It is unclear, however, whether ITC actions can be brought against state
infringers. Limited exclusion orders apply only to “persons” determined to
be violating § 1337,92 and cease-and-desist orders are limited to “any person”
violating or believed to be violating § 1337.93 Although the Tariff Act notes
that “[t]he word ‘person’ includes partnerships, associations, and
corporations,” it fails to includes states.94 Likewise, penalties under various
sections of the Tariff Act refer to “persons,”95 and 19 C.F.R. § 101.1 defines
an “importer” as “the person primarily liable for the payment of any duties
on the merchandise, or an authorized agent acting on his behalf.” 96 In Return
Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, the Supreme Court held that “[i]n
the absence of an express statutory definition,” courts shall apply the
“presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign.” 97 Given this
presumption and the fact that the Tariff Act definitions omit states, it is
unlikely that a state importer could be a direct target of an ITC investigation.
The patent holder could bring an action against the exporter of the
patented drug, and seek to have the drugs seized at the border. However, it
may not succeed if the infringing drugs would benefit public health. If the
ITC determines that an imported good infringes a patent, it is required to issue
an exclusion order “unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion
92

19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). Although general exclusion orders are also available, which
are not limited to a particular person, they can only be issued if it “is necessary to prevent
circumvention of an exclusion order limited to products of named persons” or if “a pattern
of violation” exists “and it is difficult to identify the source of the infringing products.” 19
U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2).
93
19 U.S.C. § 1337(f).
94
19 U.S.C. § 1401(d). Also, in the context of antidumping and countervailing duties,
the International Trade Administration defined “person” to include “any interested party as
well as any other individual, enterprise, or entity, as appropriate.” 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.102(b)(37).
95
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(1) (prohibiting a “person” from importing merchandise
into the United States with false or missing documentation); 19 U.S.C. § 1593a(a)(1)
(prohibiting a “person” from receiving payment for goods from someone else based on false
import documentation); 19 U.S.C. § 1436(b) (noting “[a]ny master, person in charge of a
vehicle, or aircraft pilot who commits any violation listed in subsection (a)” with “master”
defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1401 as “the person having the command of the vessel”); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1453 (subjecting “the master of such vessel or the person in charge of such vehicle and
every other person who knowingly is concerned, or who aids therein” to penalties for
merchandise and baggage lacking an appropriate license or permit).
96
19 C.F.R. § 101.1 (emphasis added).
97
Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1861-62 (2019)
(quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 780-81
(2000)). That “presumption is ‘particularly applicable where it is claimed that Congress has
subjected the States to liability to which they had not been subject before,’” Vt. Agency, 529
U.S. at 780–81 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989)), and “it
may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.”
Return Mail, 139 S. Ct. at 1862 (quoting Stevens, 529 U.S. at 781).
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upon the public health and welfare . . . it finds that such articles should not
be excluded from entry.”98 Although it is uncommon, the ITC has limited the
use of exclusion orders when public health could be undermined. 99 For
example, in Certain Microfluidic Devices, the ITC issued a Limited
Exclusion Order and a Cease and Desist Order, both of which permitted the
continued importation of infringing goods that were needed for ongoing
medical research.100 In a related Commission Opinion, the ITC noted that the
technology at issue was needed for research related to cancer and
cardiovascular disease, and it emphasized the importance of the research. 101
Based on this reasoning, it seems unlikely that the ITC would exclude lifesaving drugs if the non-infringing alternative was scarce.
b. U.S. Food & Drug Administration
The greatest threat to states that unlawfully import drugs is the FDA. The
FDA’s mission includes “protecting the public health by ensuring the safety,
efficacy, and security” of drugs,102 but its regulations can hinder states that
try to improve drug access. For example, states cannot legally import
prescription drugs from other countries. 103 A 2003 law authorizes Canadian
drug imports, but requires the FDA to certify that such importation would not
create a safety risk. No drug has ever been certified under this law.104
98

19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
See Matthew J. Rizzolo & Rachael Bacha, In a Rare Move, ITC Applies Public Interest
Factors to Exempt Research-Related Microfluidic Devices from Exclusion Order, ROPES &
GRAY (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2020/01/In-a-RareMove-ITC-Applies-Public-Interest-Factors-to-Exempt-Research-Related-MicrofluidicDevices; Kumar, supra note 88, at 1567-68 (collecting cases when exclusion orders were
denied based on public welfare concerns).
100
See In the Matter of Certain Microfluidic Devices, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-1068,
2019 WL 7049092, Limited Exclusion Order, at *2 (Dec. 18, 2019); Cease and Desist Order
at 2-3 (Dec. 18, 2019); see also, Matthew J. Rizzolo & Rachael Bacha, ITC Decision Shows
Importance of Public Interest for Biotech, LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2020, 4:40 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1235697/itc-decision-shows-importance-of-publicinterest-for-biotech (discussing Certain Microfluidic Devices).
101
In the Matter of Certain Microfluidic Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-1068, 2020 WL
225020, Comm’n Op., at *17 (Jan. 10, 2020).
102
FDA, What We Do (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do.
103
See Rachel E. Sachs & Nicholas Bagley, Importing Prescription Drugs from
Canada—Legal and Practical Problems with the Trump Administration’s Proposal, 382
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1777, 1777 (May 7, 2020) (discussing several legal problems with the
Trump Administration’s proposal to allow states to import drugs from Canada and
characterizing it as “political theater”); see also Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical
Federalism, 92 IND. L. J. 845, 870 (2017) (observing that “[t]he FDA has consistently opined
that importing unapproved drugs from other countries is prohibited under federal law,” due
to safety concerns).
104
See Zettler, supra note 103, at 871 (noting that no Secretary has determined that
99
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Moreover, absent authorization by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services for medical emergencies or shortages, only the manufacturer may
import drugs.105
States have attempted to circumvent these stringent regulations without
success.106 In 2013, Maine passed a law permitting people to purchase drugs
from several foreign pharmacies,107 drawing on its power to regulate medical
practice.108 Under the state law, retail pharmacies in Canada, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand were exempt from state licensing
requirements for retail pharmacies. 109 However, a federal district judge ruled
that Maine’s law was preempted by federal law because it regulated
pharmacies outside Maine’s borders.110
The FDA has shown some willingness to relax regulations during the
COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the FDA made it easier for states to
import personal protective equipment and other medical devices, and it issued
an Emergency Use Authorization for various disposable masks. 111 However,
it is unclear whether this tolerance would extend to non-FDA approved drugs.
In April 2020, the FDA claimed to be “working to address the COVID-19
pandemic by facilitating imports of drugs to potentially treat COVID-19,” 112
but it does not appear to have made forward progress. It is therefore unclear
how the FDA would react if a state were to attempt to import drugs that were
only approved by a foreign regulatory agency for use abroad.

Canadian drug imports “would be safe and cost-effective”).
105
Thomas J. Bollyky & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Reputation and Authority: The FDA and
the Fight over U.S. Prescription Drug Importation, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1331, 1342 (2020).
106
See Zettler, supra note 103, at 848-49 (discussing several efforts by states to establish
drug policies that are less restrictive than federal ones).
107
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13731 (West 2020).
108
See Zettler, supra note 103, at 871 (discussing Maine’s unsuccessful attempt to
permit importation of non-FDA approved foreign prescription drugs).
109
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13731(1)(B) (West 2020).
110
Ouellette v. Mills, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D. Me. 2015) (“[Legislation] extend[s] beyond
the traditionally local arena of public health and safety and into the traditionally federal
spheres of foreign commerce and affairs.”).
111
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Personal Protective Equipment EUAs (May 12, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-emergency-useauthorizations-medical-devices/personal-protective-equipment-euas; U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., Importing Medical Devices During the COVID-19 Pandemic (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/coronavirus-covid-19-and-medical- devices/
importing-medical-devices-during-covid-19-pandemic.
112
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Import of Drugs for Potential COVID-19 Treatment
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/coronavirus-covid-19-drugs/import-drugspotential-covid-19-treatment.
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B. States Directly Manufacturing Patented Drugs
The United States has a critical shortage of domestic drug manufacturing
facilities, and it is unclear what percentage of needed raw materials are
domestically sourced.113 In 2020, the Department of Health and Human
Services announced a plan to partner with private industry to expand U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity “for use in producing medicines
needed during the COVID-19 response and future public health
emergencies.”114 But rather than leave this issue to private industry, states
with sufficient resources could create manufacturing facilities and produce
their own drugs. Although production of complex drugs like vaccines may be
out of reach in the short term, states could start with producing simpler
drugs.115 The long-term goals would be to increase domestic drug production
capacity and to enable drug production during shortages.
Such facilities would have utility far beyond pandemics. Many older
drugs including insulin are prohibitively expensive,116 because few
pharmaceutical companies manufacture them.117 Were states involved in
domestic drug manufacturing, they could put competitive pressure onto
pharmaceutical companies to lower drug prices. Any excess manufacturing
capacity could be contracted out to pharmaceutical companies during
shortages.
States that manufacture patented drugs would still encounter legal and
practical hurdles. Although a state cannot be forced to pay damages as a direct
infringer, a few district court cases suggest that contractors and suppliers

113

Safeguarding Pharmaceutical Supply Chains in a Global Economy Before the H.
Comm. on Energy and Com., Subcomm. On Health, 116th Cong. (2019), (Statement of Dr.
Janet Woodcock, Director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research at the Food and
Drug Admin.), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/congressional-testimony/safeguardingpharmaceutical-supply-chains-global-economy-10302019.
114
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Industry Partners Expand U.S.-Based
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing for COVID-19 Response (May 19, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/19/hhs-industry-partners-expand-us-basedpharmaceutical-manufacturing-covid-19-response.html.
115
See Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing of Patents During Pandemics, 54 CONN.
L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 5, 2021) (discussing how Bangladesh-based Beximco
independently reproduced remdesivir and quickly ramped up its production in 2020 and
observing that small-molecule drugs are easier to produce than vaccines and other biologics).
116
Drug manufacturers have continued to raise prices for off-patent drugs, such as
insulin. For example, Humalog, which cost $21 in 1999, cost $332 in 2019. The high cost of
generic drugs has led to deaths of patients who could not afford their drugs. S. Vincent
Rajkumar, The High Cost of Insulin in the United States: An Urgent Call to Action, 95 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 22, 22-23 (Jan. 2020), https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S00256196(19)31008-0/fulltext.
117
Id.
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could be held liable for indirect infringement under the Patent Act.118 If the
Federal Circuit agrees, then a company supplying the state with raw materials
would potentially be a contributory infringer. A state would also have to go
through the expensive and time-consuming process of obtaining FDA
approval for any drug it produces. Finally, states could face barriers with
regard to supply chains tailored to for-profit companies.119
Despite these obstacles, states should still consider producing drugs. By
doing so, they would maximize avoidance of legal liability under state
sovereign immunity. They could also take advantage of existing intrastate
and interstate initiatives that use collective purchasing power to reduce drug
costs. For example, the Minnesota Multistate Contracting Alliance for
Pharmacy has operated since 1985, negotiating discounts on behalf of
thousands of governmental facilities.120 The Northwest Consortium allows
various state agencies, local governments, businesses, and consumers to pool
their purchasing power to obtain cheaper prescription drugs. 121 State-owned
pharmaceutical manufacturers could directly serve these groups, providing a
source of low-cost drugs. Outside of public health emergencies, state-led drug
production could also help reduce the cost of generic drugs.
At least one state is currently pursuing producing its own drugs. In
September 2020, California passed a state law requiring the California Health
and Human Services Agency to enter into partnerships to produce or
distribute prescription drugs, including at least one form of insulin. 122 The
118
See Applera Corp. v. MJ Res., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (D. Conn. 2004)
(holding that even if the direct infringer “possesses a unique status precluding pecuniary
liability for its direct infringement in federal court,” its supplier may still be held liable as an
inducer under § 271(b)); Syrrx, Inc. v. Oculus Pharms., Inc., Civil Action No. 02-321-JJF,
2002 WL 1840917, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2002) (“[A] jury or a court may find the required
direct infringement on the part of a non-party State and/or their instrumentalities upon which
to predicate a finding of inducement of infringement against a private party.”). The rationale
is that although the state cannot be forced to pay damages, it is still an infringer, which can
give rise to indirect infringement for those that assist it.
119
See WAXMAN STRATEGIES, NONPROFIT PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES:
BACKGROUND,
CHALLENGES,
AND
POLICY
OPTIONS
6
(Dec.
2019),
https://waxmanstrategies.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Nonprofit-PharmaceuticalCompanies-White-Paper.pdf.
120
See JANE HORVATH, STATE INITIATIVES USING PURCHASING POWER TO ACHIEVE
DRUG COST CONTAINMENT 2 (Nat’l Acad. for State Health Pol’y) (April 2019),
https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Rx-Purchasing-Paper-Jane-Horvath-FINAL4_9_2019.pdf.
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law was, in part, a response to problems that hospitals had with maintaining
adequate supplies of drugs and medical equipment during the pandemic.123
The shorter-term goal is for California to have third parties produce generic
prescription drugs “that have the greatest impact on lowering drug costs to
patients,” as well as to increase competition in drug manufacturing, prevent
future drug shortages, improve public health, and reduce overall costs.124
However, the long-term goal is even more ambitious: the agency will submit
a report to the state legislature in July 2023 “that assesses the feasibility of
directly manufacturing generic prescription drugs” and selling them “at a fair
price.”125
Were California to directly produce its own drugs, it would pave the way
for producing scarce patented drugs during future pandemics and public
health emergencies. With the manufacturing infrastructure and raw materials
already available, California would be able to quickly respond to drug supply
problems with its own drug production. Admittedly, strict FDA regulations
remain a problem.126 But as Section C discusses below, the mere threat of
manufacturing patented drugs may be sufficient to get the patent holder to
negotiate or the federal government to use its broader powers.
C. State Action as a Catalyst for Change
As discussed earlier, unclear legal doctrines and regulatory obstacles
make it difficult to predict whether a state could be successful in obtaining or
producing patented drugs. Given these hurdles, a state might believe that it is
too risky to be worth attempting. However, were a state willing to face the
legal challenges associated with producing or importing drugs, it could put
pressure on both the federal government and patent holder to reach a solution.
Pharmaceutical companies have voluntarily lowered drug prices and even
temporarily suspended enforcement of their patents, rather than risk
governments acting of their own accord. For example, Israel issued a
compulsory license in 2020 for AbbVie’s drug Kaletra, which at the time was
a promising COVID-19 treatment.127 AbbVie subsequently announced that it
123
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would not enforce its patent rights on Kaletra.128 It may have feared that other
countries would follow, setting more bad precedent of countries refusing to
honor drug patents.
Likewise, during the 2001 anthrax scare, the U.S. government sought a
large supply of Bayer’s patented antibiotic ciprofloxacin. 129 The wholesale
pharmacy cost of the drug was $4.67 per tablet, and Bayer offered it to the
United States for $1.75 to $1.83.130 Yet countries that were not subject to the
relevant patents were producing it at significantly cheaper prices. 131 While
negotiations were ongoing, the Canadian government licensed a domestic
generic drug manufacturer to produce the drug on its behalf, notwithstanding
Bayer’s patents.132 Consequently, Bayer offered a $1.30 per tablet price for
the Canadian government and in exchange, Canada acknowledged Bayer’s
patents and agreed to acquire the drug directly form Bayer. 133 Shortly after,
the Bush Administration secured 100 million tablets for $0.95 each, having
also threatened to license Bayer’s patent to a third-party manufacturer. 134 In
a Securities and Exchange Commission filing, Bayer noted that it cooperated
to preserve its patent rights.135
Pharmaceutical companies are somewhat sensitive to negative publicity.
During the height of the AIDS epidemic, South Africa passed compulsory
licensing legislation and sought to purchase patented antiretroviral drugs
from India.136 More than 3 dozen pharmaceutical companies sued, claiming
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that South Africa was violating its international treaty obligations, 137
notwithstanding the fact that the South African government was struggling to
provide medicine to its sick citizens. Under pressure from the U.S.
pharmaceutical lobby, the Clinton Administration imposed various traderelated penalties.138 These actions led to a massive public backlash, with tens
of thousands of people demonstrating in support of South Africa. 139 In
dropping their suit, GlaxoSmithKlein’s CEO noted that as a large
corporation, it is “not insensitive to public opinion” and that public opinion
is “a factor in our decision-making.”140 An industry analyst noted that the
lawsuit was “a public relations disaster” and that it was highly unlikely that
a pharmaceutical company would sue a low-income country in the future. 141
State governments can tap into that powerful public sentiment during
times of crisis. If a state sought to procure unauthorized generic drugs for its
citizens, any opposition from the federal government or the patent holder
would generate immense public backlash. Even if a state ultimately did not
succeed in obtaining the drugs directly, its attempt could be enough to bring
the patent holder and federal government to the bargaining table. Moreover,
states could use the mere threat of independent action as a mechanism for
shaming pharmaceutical companies, in an attempt to encourage better
behavior.142

IV. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to drug shortages and demonstrated the
risks of limited access to patented lifesaving drugs. In an ideal world, states
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would be able to depend upon the federal government to take appropriate
action to secure needed drugs. However, some administrations have placed
the interests of pharmaceutical groups over that of the public. Consequently,
during such times of emergency, states should consider infringing patents and
producing or procuring needed life-saving drugs. The doctrine of state
sovereign immunity would shield states from paying any damages for patent
infringement. And because such an action would clearly benefit the public
welfare, a court or agency would be hesitant to award the patent holder
prospective relief, such as an injunction or an exclusion order.
Admittedly, importing or directly producing patented drugs carries
substantial risks for states, particularly with regard to the FDA’s enforcement
of its regulations. A state could spend time and money securing drugs, only
to have them seized by the federal government. But attempts by the patent
holder or federal agencies to prevent needed drugs from reaching consumers
would almost certainly generate immense public backlash. Consequently,
state patent infringement could put pressure onto the federal government to
use its powers to alleviate the shortage, and shame the pharmaceutical
company into doing the right thing.

